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The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is to explain the time inconsisten-
cies of the convertibility regime that led to the 2001 crisis. The argument suggests 
that the credibility requirements for convertibility induced a dynamic of legal, fiscal, 
financial and external commitments that increased exit costs and time inconsisten-
cies. The second objective is to explain the tensions of the floating regime that re-
placed convertibility in 2002. We describe the effects of a floating exchange rate on 
macroeconomic imbalance and the growing tension between competitiveness and 
inflation.
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InTrOduCTIOn
This purpose of this article is to explain the inconsistencies that led to the 
crisis of the Argentine convertibility regime (1991-2001) and the tensions of the 
managed floating regime that replaced it in 2002. The argument asserts that con-
vertibility management was strongly conditioned by its potential time inconsisten-
cies: the impact of credibility and rigidity interactions on the costs of maintaining 
or abandoning the regime. Government administration of the floating regime im-
plied a drastic change in the dynamics of the exchange rate. now officials must 
address the tension between the search for competitiveness and inflation risks
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we explain the sources of 
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imbalance that ended up undermining the sustainability of convertibility over the 
long term. Here we argue that the time consistency of the currency board crucially 
depended on the effectiveness of a series of legal, fiscal, external and financial com-
mitments by the government to compensate for the credibility problems of the re-
gime itself. In the third section, we show that the performance of the institutional 
arrangement for the managed floating system corrected the inconsistencies caused 
by convertibility, and we show the contrast between the new post-convertibility 
equilibrium – its rules, incentives, results and risks – and the currency board regime 
experience. Finally, the last section summarizes the article’s findings.
TWO CrEdIBILITIES And THE dynAmICS OF COnvErTIBILITy
“Convertibility” was proposed in April 1991 during the first presidency of 
Carlos menem (Justicialist Party) after a series of failed stabilization attempts and 
two hyperinflationary episodes (Palermo and Torre, 1994; Gerchunoff and Torre 
1996; díaz-Bonilla and Schamis, 2001). The government, by Congressional law, 
fixed the exchange rate to the level of 1 peso = 1 dollar and prescribed that the 
Central Bank’s international reserves guarantee the circulating money.
Credibility is fundamental for the performance of monetary policy (Kydland 
and Prescott, 1977; Calvo, 1978) but for convertibility, it was consubstantial 
(Palermo, 1995). The currency board mechanism is effective because it forces mon-
etary discipline, and thus it returns credibility to the nominal anchor, which, in 
turn, disciplines prices and wages. However, its time consistency is a problem. As 
a result, two types of different interacting credibilities can be discerned: an arrange-
ment of structural or long-term credibility to stabilize prices, provided by the cur-
rency board mechanism; and a credibility requirement to grant stability to the 
mechanism aimed at neutralizing the incentives for its abandonment. Consequently, 
if a government prefers to maintain convertibility, this requirement would submit 
government to the tireless pursuit of temporary or short-term credibility.
Structural credibility is related to the “monetary rule” of the currency board. 
The convertibility mechanism induced credibility because the fixed undertaking 
was based on the fact that the entire monetary base was backed by international 
reserves, such that the first was attached to the second’s level. This, in turn, limited 
the monetization of fiscal deficits. This mechanism becomes completely credible 
for the exchange rate anchor because monetary policy holds to the level of inter-
national reserves. That is the nature of the currency board.1 In this regard, the 
convertibility set-up provides structural credibility for the nominal anchor, which 
1 This structure is more credible than less rigid fixations such as the design of the Brazilian Plan real in 
1994 whose fixation left margins and did not completely submit the monetary base to the market 
(Palermo, 2004).
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is very effective for stabilizing persistent inflationary episodes caused by the mon-
etization of the fiscal deficit.
However, no matter how effective the convertibility system was at stabilizing 
in the short term, its sustainability over the long-term depended on private actors’ 
belief in the currency board mechanism’s stability and in the value of their assets 
implicated in an eventual regime change.2 And as the structural mechanism of the 
currency board rests on the existence of sufficient reserves to sustain the value of 
the fixed currency, the sustainability of the mechanism depended on capital inflows 
(or lack of outflows). Such that the monitoring of input and output perspectives of 
capital flows was a crucial source of credibility that shaped confidence in the sus-
tainability of the mechanism. Since movements in flows of capital are strongly in-
fluenced by the international interest rate and the risk rate for emerging markets, an 
increase to either of these causes a flight of capital. And, as a result, it puts pressure 
on the international reserves and feeds the currency board’s recessive mechanisms: 
a fall in monetary supply and an increase in interest rate. Flight of capital due to an 
event external to the domestic economy weakens the foundation of convertibility 
while also producing negative expectations for future sustainability.
Additionally, there were at least two domestic sources of distrust in the mecha-
nism’s sustainability. The first source involves the limitations of counter-cyclical in-
struments. Since monetary policy was subject to the limits imposed by the quantity 
of international reserves, the possibility of pursuing real goals rests solely in the fiscal 
tool, whose margin during convertibility depended on the government’s capacity to 
improve collection and incur debt (pro-cyclical). The government lacked counter-
cyclical tools, such as the exchange rate, and it had a very limited margin for making 
monetary policy. In addition, the flexibility that the possibility of putting itself in debt 
granted to it – while voluntary markets were willing to provide it with financing-
contrasted with the restrictions that the dynamics of fiscal federalism imposed on it 
in maintaining convertibility’s consistency during the cycle’s economic downturns3 
and that the reform of la Carta Orgánica del Banco Central [The Charter of the 
Central Bank] (1992) imposed on its capacity to intervene in liquidity and the qual-
ity of support for convertibility (Broda and Secco, 1996; Bonvecchi, 2002).4
2 In contrast to the systems that involved monetary substitution – dollarization or a monetary union-, 
a currency board cannot be completely credible because it can be abandoned.
3 Lacking institutional capacity to obligate the provincial states to reduce expenses, the government is 
forced to allow them to incur debt or finance it by increasing partnership transfers (Bonvecchi, 2002).
4 The reform to the Charter guaranteed the stability and independence of the monetary authority, 
regulated the extent to which the international reserves that backed the circulating currency could 
include government bonds issued in foreign currency, granted sources of flexibility, and allowed the 
BCrA maneuvering room to assist the financial system in the face of an outflow of capital. However, 
the BCrA’s autonomy allowed it to refuse to reduce the quality of the backing  – the portion in bonds- 
and thereby force the government to reduce its expenses (Bonvecchi, 2002). during the times with 
pressure on the reserves, the BCrA used said flexibility to confront the deposit withdrawals from the 
financial system. However, this flexibility was also a source of uncertainty for the agents of the market 
(Broda and Secco, 1996).
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The second source of distrust was the mechanism’s potential external fragility 
and the recessive correction formula for imbalances that unfolded. Convertibility 
had the potential for inconsistency that tends to make fixations precarious: the 
inability to correct a misalignment in exchange rate makes it very vulnerable to 
deficits in the balance of payments. Exchange appreciation in the first years of 
convertibility – which induced growth with strong purchasing incentives for for-
eigners – made its consistency dependent on the capacity to generate foreign ex-
change to finance the current account deficit. The necessary foreign exchange could 
be acquired by maintaining the inflows of capital or by increasing it through sales 
abroad. But a sudden retraction of flows (like what happened with the Tequila 
Effect) or a drop in exports (such as that after Brazil’s devaluation in 1999) would 
cause severe pressure on the reserves and the ability to correct the balance of pay-
ments deficits as a result of a downturn in activity (Porta, 1995). Any improvement 
in competitiveness that the economy experienced under the convertibility regime 
could be achieved in the short term simply through greater flexibility in lowering 
the prices of nontradable goods and services and wages and, for the longer term, 
through a relative increase in productivity. Consequently, the persistence of the 
balance of payments deficit (which by itself could set off a run against the cur-
rency) and the government’s difficulty in correcting it without a costly recession 
(which a government could reasonably wish to avoid) constitute potential incen-
tives for abandoning convertibility. These potential incentives forced the decision-
makers of economic policy to build credibility in capital that would manage to 
neutralize said incentives for abandonment in order to moderate problems of time 
inconsistency.5 In other words, the effectiveness of the currency board depended 
on the time consistency that a series of commitments could instill to compensate 
for the potential incentives for abandonment.
during the ten-year period of convertibility (1991-2001), the credibility capi-
tal aimed at ensuring the mechanism’s sustainability varied. The minister of 
Economy managed to build credibility in several ways: 1) sought to restrict the 
possibilities of changing convertibility by promoting its approval by law; 2) pursued 
the close of the fiscal gap by maintaining the drive for public service privatization 
and by adhering to the expense reductions that the bodies providing financing re-
quested in order to release funds; 3) provided fiscal benefits to the export sector to 
minimize the need for foreign exchange; 4) dollarized the public services tariffs and 
the Central Bank (BCrA, acronym in Spanish) authorized and prompted the nom-
ination of financial system assets and liabilities in foreign exchange, considerably 
increasing the costs of a devaluation; and finally, 5) proposed various convertibil-
ity exit strategies.
5 Persson and Tabellini (2000), based on the seminal works of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo 
(1978), suggest that only the rules that the policymakers do not have incentive to abandon are believable 
and time consistent. Convertibility was a rule or mechanism whose configuration and dynamics could 
generate, with the passage of time, incentives for the authorities to prefer abandoning it.
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1) Approval by law
An exchange rate regime approved by law supposes greater levels of stability 
and legal effectiveness than a decree and/or exchange rate arrangements made 
through administrative decisions by the Central Bank. Convertibility’s approval 
by law subjected its abandonment to the government’s capacity to construct a 
parliamentary majority that would approve it, and thus, it increased the require-
ments for introducing changes to economic policy, decreasing the government’s 
flexibility. However, this did not make it a completely rigid mechanism, given 
that a government with a majority legislative coalition could change the law. In 
the case of menem’s government (1989-1999), the PJ [Justicialist Party] held a 
majority in both chambers of Congress for most part of its two terms such that, 
if this had been its only obstacle, the government would have been able to change 
the convertibility law. The resource of law, while making stability dependent on 
the legislative wishes and capacities of the president, provided legal and practical 
effectiveness for the consistency and credibility of the commitment. It allowed the 
government to adapt other legal and administrative decisions to the restrictions 
imposed by convertibility. If the president did not manage to stabilize the econ-
omy under this exchange mechanism and did not have a cohesive legislative 
majority to change it quickly, he was forced to become an observer of the dete-
rioration and collapse and/or resign. And, for a president who managed to pro-
mote a law to change it, he would have to subject that change – which, as we will 
see, would imply a general breakdown of contracts – to legal constitutional con-
trol of the Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice] (CSJ, acronym 
in Spanish).6
Even though the legal nature of the exchange rate regime imposed limits and 
costs on the president’s ability to change it that presented a very powerful reason 
for a government to avoid making a change, this was not sufficiently convincing in 
the eyes of the financial operators who, in imbalanced and crisis situations (1992, 
1995 and 2001), nevertheless distrusted the willingness of the government to main-
tain convertibility and/or its capacity to acquire resources and undertake costly 
decisions aimed at sustaining the fixation regime during times of recession or severe 
pressure on the international reserves.7 As a result, while the resource of law con-
tributed to forming important credibility capital, it was insufficient in the end to 
neutralize the effects of the potential incentives to abandon convertibility.
6 díaz Bonilla and Schamis (2001) sustain that the legal nature of convertibility made it nearly impossible 
for a government to achieve reasonable timing for devaluation.
7 due to the constraints of the fixations, the evaluation that the financial operators conduct over the 
future value of their financial positions decisively influences the sustainability of the exchange rate 
regime.
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2) reduction of the Fiscal Gap
The monetary constraint meant that the government could only incur fiscal 
deficits for which it managed to acquire financing in the voluntary market or 
through credits from multilateral bodies. The results of the privatizations, the re-
covery and the Olivera-Tanzi effect during the first few years of convertibility – un-
til 1994 – seemed to indicate that the government could acquire the credibility and 
resources to moderate the influence of the ImF and finance itself through voluntary 
markets. However, the structural reduction – over the short and medium term — of 
fiscal income provoked by the 1994 pension reform, combined with the restrictions 
of fiscal federalism, placed a strong pressure on government capacity to maintain 
convertibility’s consistency (Llach, 2006 damill, Frenkel, and Juvenal,  2003).
The circumstances prone to a decrease of fiscal resources – due to increased 
international interest rate — and an increase of expenses – for example due to 
electoral cycles — became credibility tests for the stability of the convertibility 
mechanism. Said situations found the government with limited room for maneuver-
ing in negotiating with the ImF: to sustain international reserves and return cred-
ibility to the currency board, the government needed fresh funds, but had to con-
cede cuts in expenses and increases in tax pressure, intensifying the recessive impact 
of the imbalance.8 nevertheless, by subjecting itself to the recessive mechanisms of 
the convertibility adjustment and adjusting the fiscal accounts to the ImF’s criteria, 
the government was building a reputation that amplified the credibility of the 
monetary rule. Additionally, if it could overcome the crisis in the end and manage 
to again expand production, it would prove that the lack of monetary tools and 
exchange rate flexibility did not prevent it – with the ImF’s guarantee — from 
confronting shocks, maintaining macroeconomic consistency.
3) Generating Foreign exchange
The government’s efforts aimed at neutralizing the potential time inconsis-
tency of the balance of payments yielded very partial results. Credibility depended 
on the capacity to balance the current account deficit trend that exchange rate 
appreciation causes with foreign exchange from exports and capital inflows.
At the beginning of convertibility, the government eliminated most of the ex-
port duties and progressively reduced the import tariffs and eliminated quantitative 
restrictions (Heymann, 2000).9 But two years later the negative impact of the trade 
8 In its negotiation with the ImF in march 1995, the government had to increase the vAT from 18% to 
21% and cut state salaries by 15% (Llach, 2006). And in order to gain Senate approval for the vAT 
increase without partnering it with the provinces, it guaranteed the provinces a minimum level of 
partnering. Said transfer level would be, during the following imbalances, lethal for the national 
government: it would force it to compensate for the impossibility of sharing the adjustment costs with 
the provinces with greater reduction of expenses.
9 The exception was the quotas for the automotive sector.
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balance and the demands of internationally exposed sectors over trade policy forced 
the government -at the end of 1992 – to apply complementary measures aimed at 
moderating the competition and encouraging exports. Without room to find protec-
tion in a currency devaluation, industries competing with imports pushed for anti-
dumping measures, quotas and exemptions (Cherny, 2014).
To moderate dependence on capital inflows, the government planned to in-
crease exports. In this way, it sought to induce favorable behavior in the trade 
account over the medium and long term, essential for guaranteeing the intertem-
poral equilibrium of the current account of the balance of payments (damill, 2000). 
The launch of mErCOSur (South American Common market) combined with 
the appreciation of the Brazilian currency considerably increased exports — be-
tween 1994 and 1998, while the Plan real was in effect, they doubled — but also 
increased competition over the local production of tradable goods and imports.10 
As of 1998, the Brazilian currency devaluation wounded the capacity of the 
Argentine economy to generate foreign currency, which negatively influenced the 
propensity of the voluntary markets to continue financing the current account 
deficit. As a result, the reduction of exports – as of 1999 the recession causes im-
ports to fall as well – and the incapacity to correct the exchange rate misalignment 
under the convertibility mechanism undermined credibility in the currency board 
mechanism’s sustainability.
4) Dollarization and the exit costs
By increasing the costs of changing the monetary rule for a flexible regime, the 
nomination in dollars of the public services tariffs and the financial system assets 
and liabilities worked as decisive reinforcement of the commitment to the currency 
board’s stability. Consequently, local currency devaluation was difficult to recon-
cile with the rates of public services contracts, and a floating exchange rate was not 
compatible with the dollarization of the financial system. Leaving convertibility 
implied measuring the costs of the breakdown of contracts and of “pesification” 
— converting dollar-denominated accounts and debts to Argentine pesos – versus 
those of losing the seigniorage and all margin so that the monetary authority could 
apply the lender of last resort: dollarization.
After the law of convertibility entered into effect, privatizations of public ser-
vices (telephone, electricity, gas and water) were made under tariff schemes that 
varied in accordance with the united States inflation index (Gerchunoff, Greco, and 
Bondorevsky, 2003). The dollarization of tariffs allowed the government to avoid 
local inertial inflation and to have an exchange insurance to renegotiate down 
contracts and tariffs with the objective of gaining competitiveness. The exchange 
10 There was significant growth in the volume of trade with Brazil and it strongly increased the coefficient 
of imports in general (in relation to GdP, it went from 6% at the end of the 1980s to 20% in 1997) 
(Heymann, 2000).
Revista de Economia Política  35 (1), 2015 • pp. 95-113
102
insurance, implicit in the face of an eventual devaluation, widened the exit costs of 
the fixation and, thus, acted as a neutralizer of the potential incentives for abandon-
ing the monetary rule. However, just as the dollarization of tariffs contributed to 
the initial consistency of convertibility – inflation in the u.S. was less than the 
Argentine IPC [Consumer Price Index] – as of 1998 the trend inverted and the 
tariff framework favored a loss of local competitiveness (Gerchunoff, Greco, and 
Bondorevsky 2003), which increased the tension between macroeconomic incon-
sistencies and exit costs.
On the other hand, there are at least two possible interpretations of the causes 
of the growth in the nomination of the financial system assets and liabilities in 
dollars. The first suggests that convertibility did nothing more than accentuate a 
structural tendency present in countries with weak currency. Local currency is ac-
cepted as a means of payment but rejected as a store of value by local savers and 
foreign investors (de la Torre, yeyati, and Schmukler, 2002).11 under this inter-
pretation we can identify those who occupied the presidency of the Central Bank 
during convertibility: roque Fernández (1990-96) – then minister of Economy 
(1996-99) – and Pedro Pou, who presided over the BCrA between 1996 and 2001.
From this perspective, the policy options for these countries pose a dilemma. 
If the government obligates residents to save in local currency, it will cause, in the 
short term, a flight of capital and maturity mismatch, because savers tend to cut 
short their investments. By allowing the use of a strong currency within the finan-
cial system, the Central Bank moves the foreign exchange risk to credit risk because 
of uncollectible debts due to a potential mismatch. Thereby it increases the costs 
of a possible devaluation. However, Levy yeyati (2002) suggests that the dollariza-
tion of the financial system under convertibility does not shut down the risk of 
noncollectibility, which increases both if there is a devaluation and also if it derives 
from a contraction triggered by a long deflation of prices.
A slightly different interpretation suggests that, once the economy is stabilized 
under convertibility, the monetary authority could have created incentives for saving 
in the local currency and, in this way, progressively generated a larger volume of 
transactions in pesos and so moderate the preference for the dollar. This position 
was defended by the minister of Economy (until 1996) who hoped that stability over 
the long term together with the backing of the dollar would manage to strengthen 
the credibility of the local currency. However, facing each uncertainty – the mini run 
on the peso in 1992 and capital outflows triggered by the mexican crisis in 1995 – a 
dynamic that increased the dollarization of the financial system was activated: the 
Central Bank facilitated coverage in dollars to avoid flight of capital, and savers and 
financial entities – who pressured for it- opted to hoard in a strong currency. The 
11 According to this perspective, the case of Chile shows that the idea of weak currency is distinct from 
the concept of “original sin.” Chile issues external debt in pesos but has managed to establish local 
currency as a store of value for residents and, in this way, eliminates the maturity mismatch at the 
domestic level (Levy yeyati 2002).
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BCrA acted in two ways: it facilitated the peso-dollar interchangeability within the 
financial system, and it covered deposits in pesos with reserves in dollars. The result 
of this dynamic was, on the one hand, recovery of investors’ trust (Ganapolsky and 
Schmukler, 1998), but on the other, the shaping of a rate differential that discouraged 
the use of the local currency in the financial system: demand deposits in pesos had 
the highest reserves in dollars and, at the same time, very low reserves in the term 
deposits, which were those that people preferred to cover themselves in dollars such 
that loans in pesos were very expensive and deposits in pesos received lower interest 
rates (Liendo, 2006). In addition, the need to create credibility about the exchange 
rate regime mechanism’s sustainability left little margin for disagreement about their 
handling of the economy without the officials converting themselves into sources of 
uncertainty. upon the arrival of roque Fernández as minister, use of deposits in 
dollars for granting credits was deepened and, with it, the costs of making the regime 
more flexible.12 As observed in Figures 1 and 2, throughout convertibility, hoarding 
in dollars and indebtedness in foreign currency expanded.
Figure 1: Evolution of Financial System Deposits (1991-2006)
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Source: Self-developed using data from the Ministry of Economy of 
Argentina.
12 Galiani, Tomassi, and Heymann (2003) suggest that the government, upon taking advantage of the 
opportunity to use the growth of deposits and loans in dollars to mobilize investment, and thereby 
stimulate growth, underestimated the potential negative of inconsistencies between the magnitude of 
the commitments and the capacity to repay.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Credits in Dollars (1991-2006)
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5) The escape Valves 
The exit via a nominal devaluation implicated a severe balance sheets adjust-
ment, which worked as a powerful incentive for governments to avoid an exchange 
rate shift. As a result, the possibility that the government might prefer to leave 
convertibility by devaluing the currency and, consequently, increasing the risk of 
breaking down the financial system was low but not zero. As the convertibility 
mechanism’s stability depended on the agents’ belief that an eventual abandonment 
of the monetary rule would not involve a loss of wealth, increasing the regime’s 
sustainability required creating the belief that a possible change in the mechanism 
of convertibility would guarantee the repayment of debt and the value of deposits. 
That is to say, the agents’ expectation affected the time consistency of the mecha-
nism.
The time consistency of convertibility depended so crucially on the govern-
ments’ capacity to show that they wanted to and could maintain it that no official 
was willing to publicly express any doubt about it. However, the economic actors 
were not indifferent to the means the government was willing to use to resolve the 
tension between the problems of competitiveness and credibility. By giving prior-
ity to the problems of competitiveness – exchange misalignment — the government 
could be more prone to looking for alternatives to introduce flexibility. meanwhile, 
by emphasizing credibility problems – interest rate differential — it would increase 
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the willingness to add greater rigidity. Thus, in the flexibility-rigidity spectrum, the 
government had several possible responses to the question of an eventual change 
to convertibility: shift to a floating regime, the insertion of flexibility into convert-
ibility, maintaining the status quo, and dollarization.
It can be said that a regime like convertibility was incompatible with a govern-
ment that publicly expressed its intention to move to flotation in the near future. 
However, this does not mean that flotation was a less effective regime for resolving 
some of the problems involved in minimizing loss of wealth: in the face of a con-
tractive period, a devaluation could facilitate economic recovery through exports 
and generate greater accumulation of foreign exchange and avoid suspending pay-
ments (Hausmann and velasco, 2002). However, it did not resolve the problem of 
mismatch and, thus, as effective as flotation could have been for certain purposes, 
by just mentioning this possibility, the government would have very likely set off 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is nevertheless a partial exception to this impos-
sibility. devaluation is not the only possible result of flotation; in a context of in-
flows of capital, the local currency should tend to appreciate.13 However, the excep-
tion is partial because while it is theoretically true, it would be very unlikely to 
happen in practice. First, because a government lacks incentives to change convert-
ibility at a time of inflows of capital – that is to say, times of economic trust and 
stimulus-, and second, because experience was showing that a departure from fixed 
exchange rates – mexico, Southeast Asia, russia, Brazil, etc. – caused an overshoot-
ing of the currency’s price.
The three ministers during convertibility held diverging positions with regards 
to exit strategy: domingo Cavallo (1991-96 and 2001) navigated between main-
taining the essence of the unaltered status quo and shifting it by introducing some 
flexibility into the rigidity; roque Fernández (1996-99) chose strengthening the 
rigidity through dollarization as an exit strategy; and José Luis machinea’s (1999-
2001) handling sought to show that there was no reason to consider any modifica-
tion to convertibility.
Cavallo showed, in both handlings — tepidly in the October 1992 episode and 
decidedly in 200114 –, that the exit strategy was to maintain the currency board but 
by modifying the fixation (tying the peso to a basket of currencies), reducing re-
serves and increasing the percentage of bonds as backing for the monetary base 
(mobius, 1999). In this way, he aimed to introduce a dose of flexibility into con-
vertibility that allowed him to reduce the risk of a crisis of balance of payments, 
13 Cavallo assumed that convertibility would valorize the peso as much as could have come from a 
flotation that caused an appreciation of the peso. “unfortunately, the opportunity of having convertibility 
without a fixed exchange rate was lost in 1997 and after the russian and Brazilian crisis, it never arose 
again” (Cavallo, 2004).
14 “I looked for a middle path, consisting in using all possible non-monetary tools to correct the 
maladjustment of relative prices, even at the cost of delaying it, but preserving convertibility […] the 
idea was to advance toward a more flexible regime, but only after having reinsured the fiscal balance 
with the reduction of debt interest”.(Cavallo, 2002).
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obtain some margin for monetary policy-making, and moderate the recessive effects 
of eventual capital outflows. However, Cavallo’s decisions, informed by this pro-
pensity to flexibility, produced a loss of credibility for the currency board mecha-
nism both in 1992 and 2001. Said uncertainty was expressed through outflows of 
capital and runs of different intensities on the currency that compelled the Central 
Bank to sell international reserves and forced the government to cede to the dollar-
izing trend of the BCrA’s president and/or implement other measures to guarantee 
debt repayment and the value of deposits.
The change of minister of Economy in 1996 also triggered a shift in direction 
on an eventual departure from convertibility. roque Fernández – minister – and 
Pedro Pou – president of the BCrA – held a defined and homogenous position: 
increase rigidity and credibility of the monetary rule by advancing to dollarization. 
despite the fact that the u.S. Federal reserve’s rejection opened discrepancies about 
its implementation, the idea of dollarization had the approval and promotion of 
President menem, who created a Secretary of Strategic Planning attached to the 
presidency whose priority task was to develop a series of political documents about 
the benefits of advancing toward dollarization.15 The explanation of dollarization, 
privately before the ImF and much more publicly after the russian and Brazilian 
crisis,16 acted as an escape valve that reduced the risk of devaluation – identified 
with the loss of wealth – and, consequently, slowed the outflow of capital and in-
creased the short-term credibility – or moderated the loss — of the currency board.
The arrival of the coalition uCr-FrEPASO (Alliance) to government at the 
end of 1999 and of José Luis machinea to minister of Economy implicated a new 
change in exit strategy. machinea strategically clung to convertibility: the costs of 
flotation made it a very risky alternative, adding flexibility to convertibility would 
have signaled a desire to devalue and, thereby, reduced short-term credibility cap-
ital, and dollarization involved “eternalizing” the fixation and, consequently, losing 
the possibility of restoring monetary policy forever.17 He had three public argu-
ments for rejecting dollarization as an exit and avoiding a loss of credibility: it 
15 The rejection on the part of the Federal reserve of a monetary association with Argentina opened a 
disagreement about the implementation of dollarization between minister Fernández and the president 
of the BCrA, Pedro Pou. While the former considered it essential to conserve at least the returns of the 
seigniorage and introduce some type of lender of last resort arrangement to the Federal reserve, the 
financial uncertainty in 1999 encouraged Pou to promote de facto dollarization to eliminate exchange 
rate risk (Bonelli, 1999). There was also another source of possible disagreement that came from a 
diagnostic of the exchange rate misalignment from some of the minister of Economy’s officials: take 
advantage of dollarization to introduce a devaluation (Kiguel, 2007).
16 The greatest point of public explanation of the proposal coincides with the presidential proposal of 
advancing toward paying wages in dollars toward the end of may 1999 (Cavallo, 1999; rosales, 1999; 
rosales and Obarrio 1999; La Nación 1999).
17 In the words of machinea: “Convertibility does not need to be touched, it will not be modified for a 
long time.[…] dollarization is not an exit from convertibility because dollarization does not leave 
convertibility, but rather goes beyond it. The problem of convertibility is that it makes the exchange 
rate permanent, but dollarization eternalizes it” (machinea, 1999).
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reduced room for maneuvering even more, it offered little because the financial 
system was already dollarized, and it would be much more effective to carry out a 
monetary union within the framework of mercosur.18 nevertheless, without the 
dollarization escape valve, he lost a source of extra credibility for confronting times 
of temporary imbalance.
In sum, maintaining the convertibility mechanism forced decision-makers to 
pursue the mechanism’s sustainability. But at the same time, said pursuit caused 
the authorities to magnify the costs of a change. Convertibility had two phases of 
growth: 7.6% per year between 1990 and 1994, a fall following the mexican crisis, 
then recovery starting in 1996, and finally, from the second quarter of 1998 
through the last quarter of 2001, production fell by 15.6%. The accumulation of 
distortions intensified after the Brazilian devaluation (1999) and created, starting 
in 2000, a crisis dynamic: the downturn in activity impacted the fiscal accounts, 
and investors’ trust in capacity to repay public debt fell.
THE EvOLuTIOn And TEnSIOnS OF  
mAnAGEd FLOTATIOn (2002-2006)
The literature suggests that there are two ways to manage flotation: the fear 
of inflation activates an intervention directed at avoiding devaluation, and fear of 
losing competitiveness causes behaviors aimed at avoiding appreciation and the 
so-called “dutch disease”19 (Levy yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007; Bresser-Pereira, 
2008). The decision-makers adopt arrangements that allow currency floating be-
cause they provide greater flexibility for monetary and exchange rate policy, and 
it grants them room to use them with the objective of affecting real goals, such as 
stimulation of economic activity and competitiveness (Broz and Frieden, 2006; 
Corden, 2000).
Post-convertibility economic evolution was marked by the dynamic of crisis 
and the costs of changing the exchange rate regime from a currency board to 
flotation. The improvement in competitiveness granted by the devaluation and the 
recovery of the monetary tool allowed for rearranging the macroeconomy, but the 
difficulties in stabilizing the currency in a context of very reduced monetary and 
18 “The idea is that in the future, confidence can be reestablished in the currency to recover a monetary 
policy of our own. With ‘our own’ I am also referring to mercosur. […] We have to discuss today 
whether we have a unique currency, and whether it suits us to create one for mercosur, or adopt an 
existing one, such as the dollar. […] mercosur policy needs discussing before proposing such an idea,” 
asserted machinea during the Alliance’s electoral campaign (machinea, 1999).
19 Intervention aimed at avoiding depreciation –“fear of floating”– tends to be related to defense of the 
currency in the face of a financial crisis. meanwhile, to slow currency appreciation, the intervention is 
associated with contexts of high export prices (dutch disease) and entry of foreign exchange, and 
manages to preserve competitiveness and, with it, economic growth.
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fiscal resources,20 the throes of the private and public financial collapse and the 
loss of wealth and consumption capacity obstructed the potential for recovery for 
long months.21
Figure 3: GDP vs. Inflation (1997-2005)
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The pesification of the financial system’s deposits and credits moderated the 
effects of the mismatch and with it, the contractive impact of the devaluation de-
rived from the alteration in the economic agents’ balance sheet (Hausmann and 
velasc, 2002; remes Lenicov, Todesca, and ratti, 2003).22 After the devaluation, 
20 To contain the initial overreaction, the government split the exchange market: one official exchange 
rate at 1.40 pesos per dollar — which meant an initial devaluation of 28.6% of the local currency - and 
another free. But in just a few weeks, the government prescribed its unification in one free-floating 
market exchange.
21 The devaluation produced during the first quarter of 2002 provoked a pronounced rise in internal 
prices — in April, an increase of 21% had already been accumulated - and, therefore, a fall in average 
real salaries of almost 18%, whose impact on consumption accentuated the decline of aggregate demand 
which quickly fell as of midway through 2001. However the pass-through ended up low compared with 
other devaluation experiences: the nominal exchange rate during the first half of 2002 increased by 
260% and, despite the rise of internal prices, the real exchange rate (rEr) increased close to 180% 
(rapetti, 2005).
22 According to the literature, the level of financial dollarization determines if the exchange rate is a 
counter-cyclical tool capable of absorbing shocks or if it is a pro-cyclical source of economic contraction 
(Frankel, 2005). However, there were disagreements about the effects that it would produce in this 
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the real exchange rate was kept at historically high values that improved the terms 
of trade and changed the growth pattern.23
The extraordinary rise of commodities allowed the government to maintain 
export withholding taxes that promoted collection, and the restructuring of the 
debt contributed to reducing the flow of future payments (Gerchunoff and Aguirre, 
2004; Cetrángolo, Heymann, and ramos, 2007; Gerchunoff, 2005; damill, Frenkel, 
and rapetti, 2005).24 under this scheme, accelerated economic recovery produced 
rapid growth in fiscal income in relation to expenses: the primary and financial 
output surplus was a salient feature of the post-convertibility period.25
The managed flotation allowed for, in the first place, transcending the tradi-
tional external restriction –that tended to halt expansions of activity- and gain trade 
surpluses. In this way, dependence on external savings to finance sustained growth 
was moderated. Secondly, it prompted improved fiscal performance and created a 
context. There were those who considered the maladjustment between assets and liabilities an 
unavoidable contractive effect (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung, 2005) and there were those who 
proposed pesification as an exit.
23 The relationship between exports and private consumption grew from 15% in 1998 to 40% in 2006 
(Cetrángolo, Heymann, and ramos, 2007).
24 The combination of high export prices and undervalued exchange rate had created an extraordinary 
margin of profitability in the exportation of commodities susceptible to tax payments.
25 The relative value of payments to personnel and of welfare transfers in contrast to a very significant 
increase of GdP in current pesos (Cetrángolo, Heymann, and ramos, 2007).
Figure 4: Real Exchange Rate — Argentina 1991-2008 
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     Source: Self-developed using data from the Ministry of Economy of Argentina.
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greater margin for maneuvering the management of fiscal accounts. Finally, main-
taining a devalued exchange rate stimulated local production of goods strongly 
linked to employment — tradable ones — above all exportable, but also those in-
tended to substitute imports in the internal market (Frenkel and rapetti, 2005, 2012).
However, the maintenance of competitiveness that nominal devaluation had 
granted to the tradable sector was not exempt from tensions in its management 
and time inconsistencies. On one side, economic stabilization and reversion of the 
economic cycle reversed the outflow of capital and increased the foreign currency 
supply by pushing a revaluation of the local currency.26 On the other, there are two 
elements that exerted pressure on domestic prices and whose persistence along time 
mined the competitiveness gained by the intervention over the currency price. First, 
the trend toward increasing the reserves that back the monetary aggregates, which 
is associated with an accumulated increase in the real exchange rate, exerted pres-
sure on domestic prices (Levy yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007). Thus, the sustain-
ability of an undervalued exchange level depended on the way that the Central 
Bank resolved the tension between the progressive increase in the need to issue 
local currency to intervene in the exchange market – and avoid a nominal appre-
ciation of the peso – and the inflationary impact of that issuing, which would cause 
real appreciation (Frenkel, 2006). Secondly, the effects of that issuing on balance 
cause salary demands that, in the Argentine case, took on their own dynamic and, 
therefore, fed the classic competition between inflation and salaries.
In this context, two elements allowed the government to maintain a managed 
flotation oriented towards competitiveness (mFC) with relative effectiveness: a 
strong capacity of influence over the Central Bank and the launch of a mechanism 
to absorb the portion of monetary issue susceptible of putting the annual inflation 
goals at risk. In the first case, the influence is crucial: while the Central Bank is 
formally autonomous, its president and directorate are appointed by the Executive 
Power with the Senate’s approval. In the second, the results are more controversial. 
The monetary issue needed to “fictitiously” maintain the peso sufficiently depreci-
ated to guarantee a wide competitive margin for local production was relatively 
well absorbed in a satisfactory way until the end of 2005 by the Central Bank is-
suing bills. However, the persistence of the monetary issue combined with high 
economic growth (at an average of 8% between 2003 and 2007), the dynamic of 
concessions and salary demands and the reduction of the fiscal surplus began to 
impact the price index and awaken inflationary expectations. Accordingly, as of 
2006, inflation progressively escalated, and the government was able to only par-
tially moderate its increase by expanding the intensity and scope of its intervention 
in pricing (through subsidies and controls).
26 Among the factors that push for a revaluation of the peso, one that stands out is the growing trade 
surplus that the country began to show in part because of the fall in imports and in good part due to 
the exponential increase of exports.
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COnCLuSIOnS
Convertibility was a very effective mechanism for stabilizing prices but it had 
high demands on short-term credibility that caused an increase in exit costs. By not 
completely eliminating the risks of devaluation, a good part of the decisions aimed 
at returning or strengthening the convertibility mechanism’s time consistency were 
oriented with growing intensity toward a considerable increase in the inconsisten-
cies of an eventual change in exchange rate regime. And, as a consequence, the 
decisions moved progressively toward reducing the range of options for the deci-
sion-makers of economic policy.
Convertibility could be confronted with two types of imbalance of distinct 
intensity: a run on the reserves and the currency whose origin is exogenous to the 
foundations of the domestic economy – caused by the contagion of other emerging 
economies or increases in the international interest rate – or, a severe exogenous 
or endogenous pressure on the international reserves or the currency that operates 
on the already weakened economic foundations. Said imbalances placed the govern-
ments in dilemmas that grew in intensity over time. A first option was to stabilize 
the economy by raising the stakes of credibility with more dollarization and rigid-
ity and deferring costs for the future. The other option was stabilization based on 
making the exchange rate regime more flexible: produce a devaluation and adhere 
to the costs of the collapse of the private sector’s balance sheets and the suspension 
of debt payments. Consequently, maintaining convertibility depended in large mea-
sure on the government’s economic resources – access to voluntary credit or cred-
it from international bodies – to refinance debt maturities and back convertibility 
with international reserves, and on the relative weight of preferences it held in the 
trade-off between implementing the recessive adjustment caused by the currency 
board -or an eventual complete dollarization – and confronting the costs of the 
financial collapse involved in the change.
While the transaction costs of the change to flotation were enormous, the man-
aged flotation resolved a good part of convertibility’s rigidities: the exchange rate 
misalignment, the external vulnerability, and the lack of counter-cyclical tools. After 
stabilization, between 2002 and 2005 the authorities were able to manage the po-
tential inconsistency that arose from the tension between the objectives of com-
petitiveness and inflation. For this, they signaled their preference for competitiveness 
with interventions in the exchange market that deterred expectations of a revalua-
tion of the local currency and managed to control the monetary expansion by sur-
plus sterilization. With this the government managed to accumulate international 
reserves that allowed it to manage flotation, maintain a solid fiscal surplus based 
on tax revenues collected from exports and the resurgence of consumer spending, 
stimulate a high rhythm of growth and strongly decrease unemployment, at the same 
time that it avoided the classic bottlenecks of the balance of payments – maintaining 
the trade surplus and minimizing dependence on external saving. However, as of 
2006, the economic reheating and expansion of fiscal spending caused a persistent 
rise in inflation, restricting the possibilities of using exchange rate flexibility to 
maintain competitiveness and, therefore, limiting the mFC’s effectiveness.
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